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A B S T R A C T
Preferences are often based on social information such as experiences and recommendations of other people. The
reliance on social information is especially relevant in the case of online shopping, where buying decisions for
products may often be based on online reviews by other customers. Recently, Powell, Yu, DeWolf, and Holyoak
(2017, Psychological Science, 28, 1432-1442) showed that, when deciding between two products, people do not
consider the number of product reviews in a statistically appropriate way as predicted by a Bayesian model but
rather exhibit a bias for popular products (i.e., products with many reviews). In the present work, we propose a
coherence model of the cognitive mechanism underlying this empirical phenomenon. The new model assumes
that people strive for a coherent representation of the available information (i.e., the average review score and
the number of reviews). To test this theoretical account, we reanalyzed the data of Powell and colleagues and ran
an online study with 244 participants using a wider range of stimulus material than in the original study. Besides
replicating the popularity bias, the study provided clear evidence for the predicted coherence effect, that is,
decisions became more confident and faster when the available information about popularity and quality was
congruent.
1. Introduction
A recurrent research topic in judgment and decision making con-
cerns the question of how people integrate multiple pieces of in-
formation when stating preferences or making probabilistic judgments
(Dawes, 1979; Tversky, 1969). Some scholars have focused on whether
decision makers consider all available information in a compensatory
way or whether they ignore less relevant cues (e.g., Einhorn, 1970;
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). For instance, Gigerenzer and Todd
(1999) proposed Take-The-Best as a non-compensatory, lexicographic
decision-making heuristic that only relies on the most valid available
cue — a strategy that can be highly adaptive in specific ecological
environments (Davis-Stober, Dana, & Budescu, 2010). Other research
has focused on how information from different sources (e.g., social and
nonsocial cues) is integrated to make a decision (Collins, Percy, Smith,
& Kruschke, 2011; Schrah, Dalal, & Sniezek, 2006). For instance, in the
advice-taking literature, scholars have investigated how people weigh
their own opinion or experience with the advice or recommendations
by experts or other reference groups (e.g. Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006;
Yaniv, 2004).
In daily life, the relevance of both social and nonsocial information
in decision making becomes particularly evident in the domain of on-
line shopping. Many shopping websites provide their customers with
objective information about the available products (Ranganathan &
Ganapathy, 2002). In addition, it has become common practice that
customers can rate the quality of products by writing a review and
providing a rating (e.g., assigning between one and five stars to a
product; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006). Other web page visitors then see a
summary of the distribution of reviews usually presented as the average
review score and the number of reviews for a product. Given that a
majority of customers take online reviews into account (e.g., Chevalier
& Mayzlin, 2006; Kee, 2008), the natural question arises how visitors
use this kind of social information when deciding which product to buy.
Besides the obvious relevance for applied areas such as marketing
research, the domain of online reviews is ideally suited to investigate
the cognitive mechanism underlying information integration. Recently,
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Powell, Yu, DeWolf, and Holyoak (2017) investigated how people in-
tegrate information provided by different cues when making preference
judgments based on online review scores. The two cues of interest were
the product's average review score and the number of review scores.
This type of stimulus material has the interesting property that it pro-
vides both statistical and social information about a product: From a
statistical perspective, a larger number of reviews indicates that the
corresponding average review score has a smaller sampling variance
and thus provides a more precise estimate of a products quality. This
follows directly from the law of large numbers for sample means
(Wasserman, 2004, p. 76). From a social perspective, the number of
reviews provides online shoppers with social information whether a
product is popular, indicating how many other customers already
decided to buy it (Chen, 2008). Hence, a large number of reviews can be
interpreted as a cue signaling the higher popularity of the more-rated
product (Powell et al., 2017). Such decision processes where “people
will be doing what others are doing rather than using their information”
(Banerjee, 1992; p. 797) has been termed “herd behavior.” Given the
well-known limitations of people's ability to rely on statistical in-
formation in many contexts (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974), it is an important research question whether and
how individuals take sample size into account when making decisions
based on social information.
1.1. Bayesian Reasoning and a Heuristic Social-Inference Model
To test whether decision makers consider the number of online re-
views as statistical information (i.e., more reviews imply more precise
average review scores) or as a social information (i.e., more reviews
indicate more popular products), Powell et al. (2017) conducted two
online studies. Using a controlled experimental design, participants
were presented with the average review score and the number of re-
views of two fictitious products (e.g., two mobile phone cases) as shown
in Figure 1 . Based only on this information, participants stated their
relative preference for one versus the other product on a 6-point rating
scale.
To compare observed judgments against a normative baseline,
Powell et al. (2017) proposed a Bayesian model according to which the
true quality of a product is inferred based on the number of reviews n
and the average review score x (for a review of Bayesian models of
decision making, see Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). The model makes the
psychological assumption that people appropriately process statistical
information, meaning that they assign more weight to the average re-
view score x when the corresponding number of reviews n increases. To
formalize this intuition underlying the law of large numbers
(Wasserman, 2004), the Bayesian model treats the true quality of a
product as an unknown parameter θ and assumes that judgments are
based on the posterior distribution of θ given the average review score x
and the number of reviews n:
=P x n P x n P
P x n




Based on the central limit theorem (Wasserman, 2004), Powell et al.
(2017) assumed that the likelihood P(x, n ∣ θ) of the observed average
review score and the number of reviews can be described by a t-dis-
tribution with degrees of freedom determined by the number of reviews
n. Hence, the Bayesian model assumes that average review scores are
more reliable when they are based on many reviews. As a prior dis-
tribution P(θ) for the true quality of a product, Powell et al. (2017)
drew samples from the empirical distribution of average review scores
on a shopping website. Thereby, the Bayesian model assumes that the
distribution of true values θ can be approximated by the distribution of
reviews.
To illustrate a qualitative difference of using the number of reviews
as statistical versus social information, consider choosing between two
products: a mobile phone case with n1 = 150 reviews and an average
review score of x1 = 3.1 and another phone case with only n2 = 25
reviews but an average review score of x2 = 3.4. According to the
Bayesian model, the number of reviews provides statistical information
because the average review score is more reliable when the underlying
number of reviews is large. Since the empirical mean of review scores in
the relevant product category (i.e., mobile phone cases) is approxi-
mately =x̄ 3.7 (Powell et al., 2017), the Bayesian model of statistical
reasoning implies that the more-rated phone case is actually expected to
be “significantly worse” than the less-rated one (because the lower
average score of x1 = 3.1 is based on a larger number of reviews).
However, when treating the number of reviews as social information,
the more-rated phone case might appear to be more popular. In turn,
individuals might prefer the more-rated product despite its slightly
worse average review score.
Powell et al. (2017) tested the parameter-free predictions of the
Bayesian statistical model in two studies that differed with respect to
the difference in the number of reviews between the more-rated and the
less-rated product. In both studies, the number of reviews had a strong
positive effect on preferences, meaning that participants generally
preferred the more-rated product. People often preferred the more-
rated product even when it had a lower average review score than the
less-rated product, in which case the Bayesian model implies that there
is a high probability that the more-rated product is actually the worse
product. Given that the general tendency to prefer more popular pro-
ducts violates the statistical principles underlying the normative
Bayesian model, Powell et al. (2017) labeled this empirical phenom-
enon as a popularity bias.1
To explain this bias in favor of more popular products and to de-
scribe information integration in the domain of product reviews, Powell
et al. (2017) proposed a heuristic social-inference model that “predicts
a bias toward selecting more-reviewed products that is independent of
other factors” (p. 1433). This model assumes that people do not con-
sider the number of reviews n in a statistically appropriate way to judge
the precision of the corresponding average score x. Instead, they
Fig. 1. Example of the decision task presented in the current experiment.
1 When believing that other people have access to more information about the
domain of interest than oneself, it may be optimal to take the decisions of others
into account (Banerjee, 1992). Thus, labeling this empirical phenomenon as a
bias may be misleading in some scenarios. However, for consistency with the
paper by Powell et al. (2017), we still use the term popularity bias.
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interpret the number of reviews as a generally positive cue indicating
popularity. More precisely, the heuristic social-inference model as-
sumes that people's preference for one product over the other is based
on the additive combination of the difference in the average scores x1
and x2 and the difference in the number of reviews n1 and n2. Hence,
the model assumes that people generally prefer products with a higher
average review score and with more reviews, and that these two factors
contribute independently to the stated preference judgments. Using a
logistic regression model for dichotomized preference ratings, Powell
et al. (2017) showed that the heuristic social-inference model had a
good model fit in absolute terms and performed much better than the
normative Bayesian model.
Irrespective of its good fit to data, a major limitation of the heuristic
social-inference model concerns its status as a descriptive model that
lacks a clear psychological explanation of the underlying processes of
information integration (Simon, 1992). In fact, the core idea that par-
ticipants simply weigh multiple cues additively can easily be tested by
fitting a logistic-regression model with the average review scores and
the number of reviews as predictors. However, the heuristic social-in-
ference model remains silent with respect to the underlying processes of
how these two pieces of information are integrated to form an overall
preference judgment. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel,
coherence-based account of the formation of preferences based on so-
cial information that makes explicit assumptions about the underlying
cognitive processes of integrating the average review score and the
number of reviews into an overall preference rating. Importantly, the
coherence model allows to derive novel empirical predictions which
can be tested in the domain of online reviews.
1.2. Coherence-Based Judgments
Coherence theories of information integration assume that people
strive for a coherent representation of all available information based
on which they arrive at an overall judgment (Holyoak & Simon, 1999;
Thagard, 1989). Across many studies, it has been shown that the
principle of explanatory coherence can explain judgments and decision
making across a wide range of phenomena such as probabilistic in-
ferences (Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014; Heck, Hilbig, & Moshagen,
2017), recognition-based decisions (Glöckner & Bröder, 2014; Heck &
Erdfelder, 2017), information search (Jekel, Glöckner, & Bröder, 2018),
preference construction (Simon & Spiller, 2016), and legal decision
making (Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004). Based on the theoretical prin-
ciple of coherence, parallel constraint satisfaction models (Glöckner &
Betsch, 2008; Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004; Thagard &
Verbeurgt, 1998) formalize the underlying cognitive process of in-
tegrating the available information as the maximization of the co-
herence in an artificial neural network. Whereas information that is
available to the decision maker is often modeled by structural proper-
ties of the network, preference states are modeled by changes in the
energy level of the neural network (Glöckner et al., 2014). Using this
formal representation, parallel constraint satisfaction models have been
shown to predict empirical choice probabilities, confidence ratings,
search directions, and response times across various choice situations
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Heck & Erdfelder, 2017; Jekel et al., 2018;
Scharf, Wiegelmann, & Bröder, 2019).
Given that coherence theory is a general theory of information
processing, it is straightforward to derive specific predictions for the
domain of online product reviews. Just as the heuristic social-inference
model, we assume that people prefer popular products with many re-
views (Banerjee, 1992). Moreover, the relative weight of the number of
reviews and the average score determines whether the more-rated or
the less-rated product is preferred (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). However,
instead of assuming an independent contribution of the average score
and the number of reviews, we distinguish between paired comparisons
of two products in which the available information facilitates a co-
herent cognitive representation and those cases in which it does not
(Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). In congruent trials, the more-rated product
has a higher average score than the less-rated product, which provides
coherent information in favor of the more-rated product. In incongruent
cases, however, the more-rated product has a lower average score than
the less-rated product, which provides incoherent information about
the product preference. When comparing these two scenarios, co-
herence-based models such as parallel constraint satisfaction predict
that congruent cases result in relatively fast and confident judgments in
favor of the more-rated product because the larger amount of reviews
and the higher average review score provide coherent information
(Betsch & Glöckner, 2010; Heck & Erdfelder, 2017). In contrast, in-
congruent cases result in cognitive incoherence, which needs to be re-
solved in order to provide an overall preference judgment. Accordingly,
responses are predicted to be less confident and relatively slow.
Overall, these predictions imply the presence of an interaction be-
tween the number of reviews and the average review score depending
on the congruency of both factors. However, Powell et al. (2017) did
not test whether the effects of the number of reviews and the average
score were strictly additive or whether they interacted.2 In fact, the
assumption of their social-inference model that cue information is ad-
ditively combined has a long tradition in judgment and decision re-
search (Anderson, 1981; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974), and linear models
are often seen as a good approximation to judgment with often little
need to add configural or interaction terms (Brehmer, 1994; Karelaia &
Hogarth, 2008). However, without a statistical test of the interaction, it
is not clear whether the two cues (number of reviews and average re-
view score) are in fact strictly additively combined as predicted by the
social-inference model.
In the following, we contest the validity of the social-inference
model by showing that the congruence of available information affects
preference ratings and response times as predicted by coherence theory.
First, we reanalyze the data by Powell et al. (2017) to test for an in-
teraction effect between these two types of information. Second, we
report a new study that aimed at replicating the popularity bias for an
extended stimulus space. By including review-score differences up
to± 1.8 on the five-star review scale, we provide a stronger test of the
proposed coherence model than the two original studies which were
restricted to paired comparisons with relatively small review-score
differences (i.e., ∣x1 − x2 ∣ ≤0.3), Moreover, we also collected response
times to test a unique prediction of the proposed coherence model,
namely, that responses are slower when the available information is
incongruent (i.e., when the more-rated product has a lower average
review score than the less-rated product).
2. Reanalysis of Powell et al. (2017)
As a first empirical test of the coherence-based account of the for-
mation of preferences based on social information, we reanalyzed the
freely available data by Powell et al. (2017). Similar to the original
analysis, we first modeled dichotomized preference ratings using a lo-
gistic-regression model. However, instead of using a fixed-effects
model, we fitted a generalized linear mixed-effects model with random
intercepts for participants to account for the repeated-measures design
of the experiment and possible heterogeneity of preferences across
participants (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Moreover, to
facilitate the inclusion of the interaction effect in the coherence model,
we used a different dependent variable in the logistic-regression model.
Whereas Powell et al. (2017) analyzed preferences for the left versus
2 In fact, the authors concluded that “participants treated cues about choice
outcomes and prevalence as independent and additive factors, without as-
suming any subtler interaction” (p. 1441). However, we thank Derek Powell for
clarifying that the “subtler interaction” in this statement was intended as a
reference to the relatively complex Bayesian model of statistical reasoning and
not as a reference to a literal interaction in the statistical sense.
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the right product, we modeled preferences for the more-rated versus the
less-rated product as the criterion. To test the heuristic social-inference
model, we included the difference in the average review scores between
the more-rated and less-rated product as a predictor. Moreover, the
mean of the two average review scores was used as a control variable,
thus allowing for possible effects of the location of both review scores
on the five-star scale.
The fit of the mixed-effects logistic-regression model for the data of
Study 2 by Powell et al. (2017) is shown in Figure 2 A. The fitted model
curve shows that preferences for the more-rated product increase
monotonically as the difference in the average review scores increases.
Moreover, the popularity bias is reflected by an estimated intercept
larger than 50% for the case that both products had the same average
review score (i.e., x1 − x2 = 0), thus implying a general shift of pre-
ferences in favor of the more-rated product. Since the heuristic social-
inference model assumes a simple additive effect of the review-score
difference and the popularity effect (i.e., an upwards shift of the in-
tercept), the fitted regression line is a smooth function irrespective
whether the more-rated product has a higher or lower average score
than the less-rated product.
To test the coherence-based account, we extended the logistic-re-
gression model by adding another predictor, namely, a dummy-coded
congruency variable with values of 0 and 1 encoding whether the
average score of the more-rated product was either strictly smaller or
larger or equal to that of the less-rated product, respectively. By in-
cluding both the main effect of this congruency variable and its inter-
action with the difference of average scores, the logistic regression
provides a test of the coherence model for preference ratings. Figure 2 B
shows that this model assumes two separate regression lines for con-
gruent (black) and incongruent (gray) trials, meaning that the effect of
the difference of the average review scores depends on the coherence of
the available information. As predicted by the coherence model, con-
gruent information lead to a strong positive preference for the more-
rated and better-rated product, whereas incongruent information re-
sulted in less extreme preference ratings. Moreover, the impact of the
review-score difference varied between the two cases as shown by the
different slopes. Note that the regression curve for incongruent choices
(gray) did not perfectly fit the average choice frequencies due to the
inclusion of random intercepts in the nonlinear logistic link function.
Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows that the more complex coherence model
in Panel B had a better fit to the observed means than the heuristic
social-inference model with simple additive effects in Panel A, an im-
pression that was supported by a nested likelihood-ratio test, χ2(2)
= 35.7, p < .001.
Originally, Powell et al. (2017) dichotomized the observed 6-point
preference ratings as being smaller or larger than 3.5 to facilitate the
comparison of the data with the (binary) Bayesian model. However, to
base our analysis on more fine-grained information, we also analyzed
the actually observed preference ratings using a mixed-effects linear
regression model with random intercepts and the same predictor vari-
ables as for the logistic regression. Figure 2 C shows that the coherence
effect emerged even more clearly for these more granular data as shown
by the different intercept and slope of congruent versus incongruent
ratings. In line with this visual impression, the coherence model again
resulted in a significantly better fit than the additive heuristic model
(χ2(2) = 104.8, p < .001). To quantify effect size, we computed the
increase in explained variance ΔR2 for the fixed-effects terms of the
linear mixed-effects models (Johnson, 2014; Nakagawa & Schielzeth,
2013). Whereas the explained variance of the two fixed-effects terms in
the additive, social-inference model was ΔR2 = .177, the inclusion of
congruency and its interaction with the review-score difference by the
coherence model resulted in an increase of explained variance of
ΔR2 = .022.3
Similar to the results for Study 2 of Powell et al. (2017), a reanalysis
of the data of their Study 1 also supported the coherence model irre-
spective whether the logistic choice model (χ2(2) = 49.9, p < .001) or
the linear rating model was used (χ2(2) = 193.6, p < .001). Again, the
fixed-effects terms of the additive linear model explained a substantial
amount of variance in ratings (ΔR2 = .200), with a moderate increase
of ΔR2 = .032 for the coherence model. The evidence for an interaction
of the predictors with respect to preferences clearly speaks against the
additive effect of popularity and average review score as formulated in
the original social-inference model. Rather, review-score differences
had a stronger impact on preferences in incongruent than in congruent
cases.
Overall, our results support the coherence-based account of in-
formation integration. However, the reanalyses are limited by the small
number of data points and the restricted range of review-score differ-
ences. Figure 2 shows that the experimental design included only five
levels of review-score differences and that the coherence model pro-
vides a lot of flexibility to account for the corresponding observed
Fig. 2. Reanalysis of Study 2 by Powell et al. (2017). Panel A: The regression line shows the predicted probability of choosing the more-rated (MR) over the less-rated
(LR) product based on the additive, heuristic social-cue model. Panel B: Choice probability fitted by the proposed coherence model. Panel C: Fit of the coherence
model to observed preference ratings on a 6-point rating scale. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
3 We are reporting the marginal R2 measure proposed by Nakagawa and
Schielzeth (2013), which focuses on the explained variance of the fixed-effects
terms only. If the random-effects terms are considered as well, the coherence
model resulted in a conditional explained variance of R2 = .468
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means. Hence, in the following study, we implemented a larger range of
differences in the average review scores and elicited response times to
provide a stronger test of the coherence model.
3. Methods
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions
(if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the study.
3.1. Participants
To replicate the results by Powell et al. (2017), we aimed for a
sample size larger than that of the original two studies (i.e., N= 105
and N= 132, respectively). We chose a minimum sample size of
N= 200, which ensures that the standard error of the relative fre-
quency of preferring the more-rated product was smaller than 0.035 for
each of the paired comparisons. We provided participants with the
opportunity to complete the study in either German or English. This
was facilitated by the stimulus material, which was not language-spe-
cific (cf. Figure 1), and provided us with the opportunity to recruit both
German participants from the University of Mannheim and English-
speaking participants via the social media platform Reddit (Shatz,
2017). As a compensation, university students received course credit,
and every participant had the chance to win one out of ten online-
shopping vouchers each with a value of 10 €. The total number of re-
cruited participants was N= 254. After exclusion of participants (see
below), the sample size for analysis was N= 244 (mean age= 25.0,
SD= 9.1; 68.4% female) including 185 German- and 59 English-
speaking participants.
3.2. Materials and Design
The study implemented a within-subjects design in which each
participant rated the relative preference for two fictitious products in
75 paired comparisons. For each of the two products, the average re-
view score was displayed visually by the corresponding proportion of
filled stars out of five total stars with the exact value displayed directly
below (cf. Figure 1). Moreover, the number of reviews was shown in
parentheses next to the stars for each product. In each trial, the two
products differed in popularity with the more-rated product having
approximately 150 reviews and the less-rated product having ap-
proximately 25 reviews. Following Powell et al., a repeated presenta-
tion of these two numbers was avoided by randomly drawing the exact
number of reviews of the more-rated product from a uniform dis-
tribution between 145 and 155 while ensuring a constant difference of
125 relative to the less-rated product (Powell et al., 2017). The position
of the more-rated product was counterbalanced for each participant so
that both the more-rated and the less-rated product appeared equally
often on the left or right side of the screen.
The average review scores of both the less-rated and the more-rated
product were varied over nine levels between 4.9 and 2.5 in steps of
0.3. This range of review scores was centered on 3.7 which is close to
the empirical mean of average review scores (Powell et al., 2017). By
combining all nine levels of the average review scores for the more-
rated and the less-rated product, we obtained a 9 × 9 grid of paired
comparisons with review-score differences ranging from -2.4 to 2.4 in
steps of 0.3. Out of these 81 paired comparisons, the order of 75 trials
with review-score differences between −1.8, − 1.5, − 1.2, …, +1.8
was randomized and used for the analysis below. The six items with the
most extreme review-score differences (± 2.1 and± 2.4) were shown
as filler trials at fixed positions (i.e., in trial 1, 14, 27, etc.) to increase
trial heterogeneity and thus maintain a high level of involvement. Note
that the filler item with the most extreme advantage for the more-rated
product (with a review-score difference of +2.4) was used as an at-
tention check item assuming that participants did not follow instruc-
tions or responded randomly if they preferred the less-rated product
with an average review score of 2.5 over the more-rated product with
an average score of 4.9.
3.3. Procedure
The experimental setup aimed at replicating the conditions by
Powell et al. (2017) as closely as possible and was programmed and
made available via SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2018). At the start of the ex-
periment, participants gave their informed consent and were informed
about the procedure, the estimated time for completion, the possible
compensation, and confidentiality. Adapting the task description of
Powell et al. (2017), participants were informed that in each trial, they
had to decide between two mobile phone cases based on the summary
information for a set of reviews from a popular online shopping web-
site. There was no further description apart from the fact that both
phone cases were similarly priced. The instructions were shown for at
least eight seconds to ensure that participants read all necessary in-
formation.
Next, participants were presented with the 81 paired comparisons
including experimental trials in random order and filler and check items
at fixed positions. Each of the products were labeled by two uppercase
letters such as “FX” versus “ZA”, and no product label appeared twice
during the experiment. As a response scale, we used a 6-point rating
scale with a rating of 1 representing a strong preference for the product
shown on the left, and a rating of 6 representing a strong preference for
the product on the right. We also recorded response time as the time
interval between the initial presentation of the choice condition and the
click on one of the six rating-scale buttons (cf. Figure 1). Directly after
clicking on the button, the choice was logged to the data base; thus,
participants did not have the possibility to change their response.
At the end of the study, participants answered two demographic
questions (age and gender). Moreover, as a proxy for online buying
experience, we asked how often participants made online purchases
with the response options “less than once a year” (N= 15), “once a
year” (N= 47), “once a month” (N= 155), “once a week” (N= 23),
and “more than once a week” (N= 4). We also administered a ser-
iousness-check question asking whether participants had completed the
study seriously or just clicked through (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, &
Musch, 2013). On the final pages, participants were thanked for their
participation and could enter their email address to sign up for the
lottery and receive an email with information about the research goal
and results of the study.
4. Results
4.1. Exclusion of participants and trials
Of the 254 participants completing the study, six were removed
from the analysis due to giving a negative response to the seriousness-
check question. Moreover, in the attention-check trial, four participants
indicated a preference in favor of the less-reviewed product with an
average review score of 2.5 over the more-rated product with a score of
4.9. These four participants were removed under the assumption of not
paying attention to the task at hand, thus resulting in a sample size of
N= 244 for the analysis.
We also filtered trials with response-time outliers. Separately for
each participant, we removed trials with response times that were
outside three times the interquartile range (Tukey, 1977). Moreover, we
removed trials with extreme response times faster than 300ms or slower
than 20,000ms. The filtering of extreme response times let to the ex-
clusion of 536 out of 18,300 trials.
4.2. Replication of Powell et al. (2017)
To facilitate a comparison with the predictions of the Bayesian
model, Powell et al. (2017) dichotomized the observed preference
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ratings into binary choices, with values of 1 representing choices of the
more-rated product and 0 representing choices of the less-rated pro-
duct. Figure 3 shows that the observed choice frequencies made by the
participants (Panel B) differed qualitatively from the predictions of the
Bayesian Model (Panel A) as simulated for the extended stimulus set.
The discrepancy is most obvious for paired comparisons with a review-
score difference of zero (indicated by a dashed line with rounded
points): Whereas the Bayesian model predicted relatively ambiguous
choices with probabilities around 50%, empirical choice frequencies for
the more-rated product were larger than 80% irrespective of the
average review score of the more-rated product (as shown on the x-
axis). Similarly, empirical frequencies for the other review-score dif-
ferences (indicated by separate lines) were generally shifted upwards in
favor of the more-rated product relative to the predictions of the
Bayesian model, thus replicating the popularity bias. The degree of
misfit becomes even more evident when plotting the predicted prob-
abilities of choosing the more-rated product against the empirically
observed proportions as shown in the first panel of Figure 4. For almost
all paired comparisons, the more-rated product was preferred to a much
higher degree than predicted by the Bayesian model.
The conclusions of these graphical comparisons of model fit were
corroborated by sign tests addressing whether more people chose the
more-reviewed product in each of the paired comparisons (using a
significance level of α= .01). To replicate the analysis of Powell et al.
(2017), we first restricted the tests to those 25 conditions with review-
score differences of −0.3, 0.0, and +0.3 which were also included in
the original studies. For these paired comparisons, sign tests showed
that participants preferred the more-rated product in 22 of the 25 cases.
When excluding cases in which the Bayesian model was nearly in-
different (i.e., when the predicted choice probability was between
. 45 < P < .55), the model favored the less-reviewed product in 13 of
24 cases. However, for these 13 paired comparisons in which the
Bayesian model predicted choosing the less-reviewed product, sign tests
indicated a preference for the more-rated product in 10 cases (and were
not significant otherwise), meaning that participants often did not favor
the product predicted by the Bayesian model. Descriptively, partici-
pants preferred the more-reviewed product in 70.5% of these paired
comparisons, which is similar to the observed percentage of 65.5%
reported by Powell et al. (2017).
Next, we compared the predictions of the Bayesian model for the set
of all 75 paired comparisons with review-score differences between
−1.8 and +1.8. Sign tests with a significance level of α= .01 showed
that participants preferred the more-rated product in 45 out of the 75
paired comparisons. When excluding cases in which the Bayesian model
Fig. 3. Panel A: Probability of choosing the more-rated product as predicted by the parameter-free Bayesian model for the extended stimulus set used in the present
study. Note that the lines overlap for absolute review-score differences larger than 0.9. Panel B: Relative frequency of choosing the more-rated product based on
dichotomized preference ratings. The corresponding ribbons show 95% confidence intervals for the relative frequencies.
Fig. 4. Model fit of the Bayesian model, the additive social-inference heuristic, and the coherence model. The color key refers to review-score differences between the
two presented products (cf. Figure 3).
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was nearly indifferent, the model predicted a preference for the more-
rated product in 36 of 74 conditions. In all of these paired comparisons,
participants did indeed favor the more-reviewed product. However, in
the remaining 38 paired comparisons for which the Bayesian model
predicted a preference for the less-rated product, sign tests showed that
participants preferred the less-rated and the more-rated product in 10
and 22 cases, respectively. Across these 38 trials for which the Bayesian
model predicted a preference for the less-reviewed option, participants
preferred the more-reviewed product in 38.5% of the trials.
These analyses show that the Bayesian model performed slightly
better when including paired comparisons with larger review-score
differences between −1.8 and +1.8 compared to using a restricted
stimulus set with smaller differences (Powell et al., 2017). A similar
tendency can also be observed in Figure 3 A showing that empirical
frequencies were closer to the predictions of the Bayesian model for
larger absolute review-score differences compared to the original con-
ditions with relatively small review-score differences of −0.3, 0.0, and
+0.3. Overall, the results show that the popularity bias is a robust
empirical phenomenon that is pronounced most strongly if the differ-
ence in the average review scores is relatively small.
4.3. Testing the Coherence Model
To test the proposed coherence model, we fitted separate regression
models to predict the three different dependent variables (i.e., choices
and preference ratings for the more-rated product and response times).4
Similar to the reanalysis above, we used logistic regression to predict
choices of the more-rated product (i.e., dichotomized preference rat-
ings; Powell et al., 2017) and linear regression to predict 6-point pre-
ference ratings. Moreover, we used a linear regression to predict log
response times. Each of the three models included the same four pre-
dictor variables as in the reanalysis in Section 2: First, the difference in
the average review scores of the more-rated and the less-rated product;
second, the congruency dummy variable with a value of 0 if the more-
rated product had a lower average review score and 1 otherwise; third,
the interaction of review-score difference and congruency; and forth,
the mean review score of the two products which served as a control
variable. In all models, we included a random intercept to account for
possible differences between participants. All generalized linear mixed
models were fitted in R using the package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015).
Data and R scripts are available on the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/mzb7n/).
For each of the three dependent variables, we tested the coherence
model against the additive, heuristic social-inference model which does
not include the main effect of congruency and its interaction with the
review-score difference as predictors. The corresponding likelihood-
ratio tests indicated a significant discrepancy between the two models
for all three dependent variables including the logistic regression of
dichotomized choices (χ2(2) = 453.6, p < .001), the linear regression
of preference ratings (χ2(2) = 3376.1, p < .001), and the linear re-
gression of log response times (χ2(2) = 582.2, p < .001). With respect
to predictive performance, the fixed-effects terms of the heuristic model
explained ΔR2 = .544 of the variance in preference ratings, with the
coherence model having an incremental validity of ΔR2 = .064. For log
response times, the additive model explained a smaller proportion of
observed variance (ΔR2 = .052), with the coherence model again
having substantial incremental validity (ΔR2 = .020).5
In addition to these quantitative measures of model fit, Figure 4
provides a direct comparison of how well the Bayesian model, the
heuristic social-inference model, and the coherence model predicted the
observed choice proportions. Whereas the Bayesian model generally
underestimated the popularity of the more-rated products, the additive
heuristic model showed a tendency to overestimate the popularity of
more-rated products that had only a slightly worse average review score
than their less-rated competitor (i.e., incongruent cases with review-
score differences of −0.3 and −0.6). Note that these paired compar-
isons are the ones in which the incoherence of the available information
is maximal, and in turn, these cases were better described by the co-
herence model.
Overall, these results provide evidence in favor of the coherence
model which assumes a main effect and interaction of congruency. The
corresponding parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values for
the regression coefficients are reported in Table 1 . Moreover, for the
linear regression models of ratings and log response times, Table 1 also
shows the proportion of unique variance ΔR2 explained by each of the
fixed-effects terms of the coherence model.
Figure 5 shows that the coherence model had a very good fit for
each of the three dependent variables. For dichotomized choices (Panel
A), relative frequencies of preferring the more-rated product were close
to one, in line with the prediction that coherent information results in
stronger preference for the better-rated product with more reviews. In
contrast, choice frequencies were around 50% when the conflict be-
tween the available information was large, that is, when the more-rated
product was slightly worse than the less-rated product. Once the dif-
ference in average scores became larger, preferences for the better-
rated product with less reviews became stronger. The same pattern
emerged when analyzing observed preference ratings instead of di-
chotomized responses (Panel B). In this case, the discrepancy between
incongruent and congruent conditions became even more pronounced
as indicated by the larger gap of the regression lines for a review-score
difference of zero. Most importantly, we also found a coherence effect
for response times. As predicted, responses were on average faster in
congruent than in incongruent conditions. Moreover, in both cases,
responses were slowest when the conflict between the available in-
formation was largest (i.e., when review-score differences were close to
zero). Once the difference in the average review scores increased, re-
sponse times became faster both for congruent and incongruent con-
ditions. These results are in line with the coherence-based account ac-
cording to which decision conflict decreases when the review-score
difference becomes very large (in which case it is easier to achieve a
coherent representation since the number of reviews has less weight;
Heck & Erdfelder, 2017).
5. Discussion
By replicating the main findings of Powell et al. (2017), we showed
that the popularity bias is an empirically robust phenomenon, meaning
that people generally tend to prefer more-rated over less-rated pro-
ducts. In contrast to the predictions of a Bayesian model of statistical
reasoning (Powell et al., 2017), this also holds if the more-rated product
has a lower average review score than the less-rated product. Going
beyond a direct replication, we showed that the popularity bias also
holds for a larger range of review-score differences, although the effect
is strongest when the average review scores of two products are similar.
To explain the cognitive mechanisms underlying preference judg-
ments in the domain of online reviews, we proposed a coherence-based
account of preference formation based on the integration of social in-
formation. Assuming that people strive for a coherent representation of
4 Given that “dichotomized choices” are obtained by a deterministic trans-
formation of the observed preferences ratings, the two corresponding analyses
are statistically dependent. Nevertheless, we decided to report the logistic re-
gression to facilitate a comparison with the original analyses by Powell et al.
(2017).
5 When considering the conditional R2, which also considers the random in-
tercepts (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013), the proportion of variance in ratings
(footnote continued)
and log response times explained by the coherence model was R2 = .694 and
R2 = .412, respectively.
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all available information (Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001; Thagard
& Verbeurgt, 1998), we predicted a coherence effect for preference
ratings and response times: In addition to the simple main effects of
average score and number of reviews, the speed and confidence of
preference judgments should depend on the match between the two
cues, that is, whether the more-rated product also has a higher average
score. Thereby, the model differs from the heuristic social-inference
model proposed by Powell et al. (2017), which assumes simple additive
effects of the number of reviews and the average review score on pre-
ference ratings and remains silent with respect to response times.
We tested the proposed coherence model in a reanalysis of the data
by Powell et al. (2017) as well as in a new empirical study in which we
extended the range of review-score differences presented to the parti-
cipants. Using generalized mixed effects models, we defined a dummy-
coded predictor to model congruent and incongruent cases in which the
more-rated product had the higher or lower average review score, re-
spectively. The analyses showed that both preference ratings and re-
sponse times were strongly affected by this congruency variable and its
interaction with the review-score difference, thus corroborating the
proposed coherence model. As predicted, preference ratings were more
extreme and faster when the available information was congruent, that
is, when the more-rated product had a higher average review score. In
contrast, preference ratings were more ambiguous and slower when the
available cues provided conflicting information, that is, when the more-
rated product had a lower average score. This effect emerged most
clearly for highly incoherent cases, that is, for paired comparisons in
which the more-rated product had only a slightly worse average review
score. These cases produced very large response times (see Figure 5)
and choice proportions that were fitted much better by the coherence
model than by the social heuristic model (see Figure 4), thus corro-
borating the proposed coherence-based account of information in-
tegration.
5.1. Coherence-Based Accounts in Judgment and Decision Making
The proposed coherence model provides a psychological explana-
tion of how social information is integrated into the formation of pre-
ferences. According to the theory of coherence as a general principle of
information integration (Thagard, 1989), preferences and holistic
judgments are formed by searching for a coherent internal representa-
tion of the available information. If a choice option is favored on all
dimensions, the available information is congruent and the model
predicts that people respond faster and with higher confidence
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). In contrast, if different choice options are
favored on different dimensions, the available information is incon-
gruent and the model predicts that people respond more slowly and
with lower confidence. By showing that these systematic patterns of
preference ratings and response times also emerge in preference for-
mation based on social information (i.e., product reviews by other
customers), our work extends the scope of coherence as a general
theory of integrating different types of information into a holistic
judgment (Glöckner et al., 2014).
Table 1
Estimated regression coefficients for the coherence model.
Estimate SE df t p ΔR2
Choices: Hierarchical logistic regression
(Intercept) −0.979 0.213 −4.59 < .001
Review-score difference
(MR–LR)
2.943 0.090 32.88 < .001
Congruency (0=no;
1=yes)
2.096 0.106 19.73 < .001
Difference × Congruency −0.995 0.180 −5.54 < .001
Mean review score 0.606 0.048 12.74 < .001
Preference ratings: Hierarchical linear regression
(Intercept) 2.896 0.056 2640 51.46 < .001
Review-score difference
(MR–LR)
1.142 0.021 17521 55.65 < .001 .053
Congruency (0=no;
1=yes)
1.043 0.025 17520 41.53 < .001 .013
Difference × Congruency −0.750 0.026 17520 −29.14 < .001 .030
Mean review score 0.316 0.012 17519 27.20 < .001 .015
log Response times: Hierarchical linear regression
(Intercept) 8.895 0.036 1136 248.30 < .001
Review-score difference
(MR–LR)
0.123 0.011 17518 10.71 < .001 .004
Congruency (0=no;
1=yes)
−0.184 0.014 17517 −13.11 < .001 .016
Difference × Congruency −0.339 0.014 17518 −23.60 < .001 .006
Mean review score −0.144 0.006 17517 −22.28 < .001 .018
Note. The review-score difference refers to the difference of average review
scores between the more-rated (MR) and the less-rated (LR) product. For the
logistic regression, the t-value column contains normally-distributed z-statistics
(hence, the degrees of freedom are missing). For the two linear models, the
effect size ΔR2 shows the proportion of unique variance explained by each of
the regression terms.
Fig. 5. Panel A: Relative frequency of choosing the more-rated product. The regression lines show the predicted probabilities of the proposed coherence model. Panel
B: Fit of the coherence model to observed preference ratings. Panel C: Fit of the coherence model to log response times. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Our results are in line with a growing literature providing evidence
for the validity of coherence-based accounts for many phenomena and
contexts in judgment and decision making. Originally, explanatory
coherence was proposed as a theory of how people reason in everyday
life when faced with a set of explanatory hypotheses (Thagard, 1989),
for instance, when forming impressions of other individuals based on
stereotypes, traits, and behavior (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Extending
these ideas to preference judgments in multiattribute decision making,
Simon, Krawczyk, et al. (2004) showed that preferences are dynami-
cally constructed by maximizing the coherence of the available in-
formation. The theory successfully predicted that preferences develop
during the time course of decision making (Simon et al., 2001), that
more information is processed faster than less (Betsch & Glöckner,
2010), and that, after a decision, the relative weight of cues is adjusted
in line with the given choice (Glöckner, Betsch, & Schindler, 2010;
Simon, Krawczyk, et al., 2004). More recently, computational models of
coherence for probabilistic inferences have been developed to explain
how people search for missing information in multiattribute decisions
(Jekel et al., 2018; Scharf et al., 2019) and how they integrate in-
formation from memory during information integration (i.e., whether a
choice option is recognized; Glöckner & Bröder, 2014; Heck &
Erdfelder, 2017). The present work builds on these findings, showing
that a coherence-based account can also explain how social information
is used in preference formation.
To explain how people rely on social information, we adapted an
interpretation of coherence-based theories assuming “fast, automatic
processes that lead to consistent mental representations of the task and
intuitive choices that emerge without awareness of the process itself”
(p. 642; Glöckner et al., 2014). According to this view, the polarity of
the available cues is jointly evaluated by fast, dynamic processes as
modeled by parallel constraint satisfaction theory, a network model
that simulates the activation of a set of bidirectionally connected nodes
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997). Importantly,
our definition of coherence thus differs from an alternative interpreta-
tion according to which people are assumed to adhere to logical co-
herence as required by normative theories of rational decision making
(Arkes, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2016; Hammond, 2000). In fact, such a
normative view served as the basis for Powell et al.'s Bayesian model
which treats the number of reviews as statistical information and could
not account for the popularity effect found in the observed preference
ratings.
In the present context of product preferences, one might think of yet
another interpretation of coherence in terms of the plausibility of a
distribution of product reviews with prior knowledge (Connell & Keane,
2006).6 When asked to give a preference judgment for the two products,
participants might construct a mental model of other customers
(Johnson-Laird, 1980), assuming that people usually prefer products
with high average review scores. According to such a mental model, it is
implausible (i.e., “incoherent”) that a product with many reviews has a
low average review score because people would have stopped buying
the product, implying that a large number of reviews could not have
accumulated.
However, such a mental model of other customers would be at odds
with the actual distribution of reviews on shopping websites, given the
absence of an ecological correlation between the number of reviews and
the average review score (Powell et al., 2017). Moreover, it is difficult
to reconcile how the plausibility account could explain the pattern of
observed response times shown in Figure 5 . For incongruent cases, the
mental model becomes more implausible as the absolute review-score
difference in favor of the less-rated product increases. When assuming
that the construction and evaluation of mental models requires more
time with decreasing plausibility, it follows that response times should
increase. However, Figure 5 clearly shows that mean response times
decreased for larger absolute review-score differences in incongruent
cases, thus providing evidence against the hypothesis that participants
assessed the plausibility of a mental model. In contrast, the coherence
model proposed in the present paper assumes a fast, automatic process
of information integration and thus predicts this decrease in response
times. Essentially, incoherence of the available information is maximal
if the more-rated product has only a slightly worse average review
score, whereas incoherence decreases if the more-rated product is
clearly worse than the less-rated product. Note that a similar effect has
been found in multiattribute decision making, where adding positive
cues to a slightly favored option leads to faster responses even though
more information has to be processed (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010; Heck &
Erdfelder, 2017). Finally, given that our experimental paradigm lacked
details about the specific products or context, we think that the task
fostered fast, automatic responses as opposed to elaborate, effortful
processes as required for the construction and evaluation of mental
models.
5.2. Limitations and Future Directions
In the controlled experimental setting proposed by Powell et al.
(2017), participants had to state preferences for fictitious mobile phone
cases based only on the average review score and the number of re-
views. This design has the advantage that one can directly draw con-
clusions about the impact of the number of reviews on preferences
without having to account for actual differences in product quality as
required in correlational studies (e.g., Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006).
However, despite this advantage of having a high internal validity, the
controlled experimental design cannot be used to test the relative im-
pact of the number of online reviews compared to other information
such as longer text reviews in which customer's describe their experi-
ences with a product (Sridhar & Srinivasan, 2012). Still, the core
finding that people show a preference for more popular products has
also been supported by studies in marketing research, which focus on
the prediction of buying decisions based on customer reviews. In sev-
eral of these studies, larger numbers of reviews were associated with
increased sales ranks of books (e.g., Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Sun,
2012) or video games (Zhu & Zhang, 2010). However, in contrast to
these correlational analyses of sales statistics, the experimental setting
used by Powell et al. (2017) allows to test causal effects of the average
score and the number of reviews irrespective of differences in the true
quality of products.
Besides the number of reviews and the average score, the present
study ignored other features of the distribution of online reviews that
may affect preferences. For instance, Sun (2012) showed that the
standard deviation of the distribution of product reviews also affects
sales ranks, a finding that is in line with the proposed coherence-based
account. Given that a large variability of products indicates incoherence
of the available information, preference construction should require
more time and result in more ambiguous preferences compared to cases
where reviews are more homogeneous. Similarly, empirical distribu-
tions of online reviews are often bimodal, meaning that most reviews
are either very positive or very negative (Hu, Pavlou, & Zhang, 2006),
an effect possibly due to the self-selection of reviewers on shopping
websites (Hu, Zhang, & Pavlou, 2009). Again, a high degree of bi-
modality indicates a larger degree of incoherence of the available in-
formation and should result in similar patterns of preference ratings as
high standard deviations. However, since studies in marketing research
have usually focused on the prediction of sales ranks (Hu et al., 2006;
Sun, 2012), it might be necessary to adapt a more controlled experi-
mental design such as that used in the present study to disentangle the
effect of other features of the distribution of reviews.
Going beyond the domain of online reviews, future research could
elaborate and test novel predictions of the proposed coherence model
for the integration of social information. First, one could investigate
whether the direction of incoherence matters. In fact, it could be more6We thank Derek Powell for bringing up this alternative explanation.
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incoherent to have many reviews for a poorly rated product than few
reviews for a highly-rated product. However, since participants only
provided a single relative judgment for both products in our study, we
cannot test for a possible asymmetry between the incoherence of a less-
rated product with a high score and a high-rated product with a low
score. Second, the paradigm could be extended in order to test the
prediction of a post-decisional coherence shift, that is, whether the
relative weight of the number of reviews increases after deciding in
favor of the more-rated product (e.g., Simon, Krawczyk, et al., 2004).
Finally, future research could focus on developing a computational
model of the proposed coherence-based account, for instance, by
adapting previous implementations of parallel constraint satisfaction
theory for multiattribute decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008;
Glöckner et al., 2014).
5.3. Conclusion
The domain of online reviews provides a rich source of information
for testing theories about preference construction based on social in-
formation. First, in times of the Internet, online reviews are of a high
practical relevance for customer decisions and marketing. Second, the
number of reviews has a special theoretical property, namely, that the
sample size provides both statistical information (i.e., about the relia-
bility of the average score) and social information (i.e., about the po-
pularity of a product). Besides replicating the empirical finding that
people prefer popular products with many reviews (Powell et al., 2017),
we showed that the popularity bias also holds for a wider range of
stimulus materials than that used in the original study. Moreover, we
proposed a coherence explanation of empirical patterns in the observed
preference ratings and response times. Thereby, the present study
provides evidence that a coherence-based theory of information in-
tegration can account for preference formation based on social in-
formation.
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